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This paper  draws  attention  to a powerful  human  motive  that  has  not  yet  been  incorporated
into  economics:  the  desire  to  make  sense  of our immediate  experience,  our  life,  and our
world.  We  propose  that  evolution  has  produced  a  ‘drive  for sense-making’  which  motivates
people  to gather,  attend  to, and  process  information  in  a fashion  that  augments,  and  com-
plements,  autonomous  sense-making.  A  large  fraction  of  autonomous  cognitive  processes
are devoted  to making  sense  of  the  information  we  acquire:  and  they  do  this  by  seeking
simple  descriptions  of  the  world.  In some  situations,  however,  autonomous  information
processing  alone  is  inadequate  to  transform  disparate  information  into  simple  representa-
tions, in  which  case,  we  argue,  the  drive  for sense-making  directs  our  attention  and  can  lead
us to seek  out  additional  information.  We  propose  a  theoretical  model  of  sense-making  and
of  how  it  is  traded  off  against  other goals.  We  show  that  the  drive  for  sense-making  can
help  to make  sense  of  a wide  range  of disparate  phenomena,  including  curiosity,  boredom,
‘ﬂow’,  conﬁrmation  bias  and  information  avoidance,  esthetics  (both  in  art  and in  science),
why we  care  about  others’  beliefs,  the  importance  of  narrative  and  the  role  of ‘the  good  life’
in human  decision  making.
© 2015  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
. Introduction
In his 1864 masterpiece, Utilitarianism,  John Stuart Mill embraced Bentham’s Utility Principle, but proposed a more
xpansive conception of utility than the purely pleasure and pain-based concept proposed by Bentham. With his famous
tatement that “it is better to be a human being dissatisﬁed than a pig satisﬁed; better to be Socrates dissatisﬁed than a fool
atisﬁed,” (260) Mill drew attention to the importance of insight and wisdom, and of appreciating ‘higher’ pleasures such
s art and music. Insight and knowledge, Mill felt, were goals, above and beyond the seeking of pleasure and avoidance of
ain, that people should and do strive for. Yet subsequent implementations of different conceptions of utility in economic
heory have rarely dealt with the types of ‘higher’ pleasures discussed by Mill in a substantive fashion. Even the broadest
otions of utility that have been proposed, for example ‘ego utility’ or belief-based utility, fail to account for the enormous
ime, money and attentional resources that people devote to sense-making.In this paper we posit the existence of a ‘drive for sense-making’ which, we argue, is analogous to better known drives such
s hunger, thirst and sex. We  review diverse research on sense-making from psychology, then lay out the basic elements
f a theoretical model of utility maximization that incorporates sense-making as an ingredient of utility. In our model,
ndividuals have two goals that drive their behavior: (1) to construe our lives in a positive fashion (valence); and (2) to
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construe our lives in a way that makes sense (sense-making). Given that both involve events occurring purely in the mind,
they might seem to favor a life consisting of purely mental activity—e.g., fantasizing that one’s life is desirable and makes
sense. However, both of these tendencies are severely constrained by the brain’s autonomous sense-making capabilities,
which are involuntary and have the sole objective of maximally simplifying information (i.e., are not inﬂuenced by valence).
We can make deliberate (non-autonomous) decisions about whether to collect information, but we have no ability to dictate
how we will interpret the information we collect, nor, of course, to choose what we will discover when we  choose to collect
information.
The model has novel implications both for when people choose to obtain or avoid information, but also for more ordinary
economic decisions. Given the constraints on self-deception inherent in the autonomous processes’ sole concern with sense-
making, in most situations the safest and most direct route toward ensuring that our image of our lives is favorable and
makes sense, is to live a life that has positive features and that can be made sense of. We  discuss a wide range of applications
of the model, including curiosity (the desire for information for its own  sake), boredom, ﬂow (the pleasure of sense-making),
conﬁrmation bias, information avoidance, consumer choice, esthetic preferences (including both art and science), concern
about others’ beliefs, conspiracy theories and religion, the importance of narrative, and the role of the ‘good life’ in decision
making and life satisfaction.
2. Sense-making and simpliﬁcation
The Oxford English dictionary deﬁnes a drive as “an innate, biologically determined urge to attain a goal or satisfy a
need” (Stevenson, 2010, p. 535), and this is the sense in which we use the term here. Due to profound limitations on
how much information the brain can process and store, as well as the desire for efﬁciency in communication, evolution
has produced elaborate neural mechanisms for the simpliﬁcation and distillation of information. Such processes guide
perception, language, memory, and a wide range of other cognitive processes. Knowing that the object in front of one is a
table, for example, we can safely assume that it is solid, ﬂat, elevated from the ground, can hold a laptop and drinks, as well
as myriad other properties that are difﬁcult to enumerate because they are so fully assimilated in our mental representations
of tables that we are unaware of their existence.
The view that perception and cognition seeks to make sense of the world has a long and varied history. For example,
Gestalt psychology, a school of psychology that thrived in the early 20th century, was  concerned with the acquisition of
meaningful perceptions in a chaotic world. Gestalt psychologists enumerated a series of ‘laws’ or ‘principles’ dictating how
the mind makes sense of the environment by constructing global wholes—‘Gestalts’—from otherwise chaotic stimuli (Koffka,
2013/1935; Rock and Palmer, 1990).
Fig. 1 shows some classic stimuli that demonstrate Gestalt principles. In the left hand stimulus (due to the celebrated
Italian psychologist Kanizsa, 1979), postulating an invisible square that covers some of the black blobs ‘makes sense’ of
the missing elements. Similarly, the third stimulus can best be made sense of by postulating a 3D white ‘wire frame’ cube
which partially occludes the black circles seen as behind it. The integrated nature of this interpretation is made particularly
evident in virtue of the ambiguity of the wire-frame cube—it is a so-called Necker cube, much discussed psychology and
neuroscience). When the cube ‘ﬂips’ from appearing to be viewed from above and tilted to the viewer’s left, to appearing to
be viewed from below and tilted to the viewer’s right, the black circles at the vertices of the cube correspondingly appear to
change ‘depth.’ The second ﬁgure, Idesawa’s (1991) sphere, is perhaps even more remarkable. The brain creates a smooth
white sphere (which appears, to many observers, to be a brighter white than the surround) radiating conical black spines in
three dimensions, from a collection of ﬂat black geometric shapes. According to Gestalt theory (e.g., Chater, 1996; Pomerantz
Fig. 1. Sense-making in perception. The brain prefers organizations which provide a simple encoding of the sensory input. (a) A white square that the brain
creates in order efﬁciently to encode the various ‘lost’ chunks of some of the ﬁlled black circles (ﬁgure devised by Italian psychologist Gaetano Kanizsa);
(b)  a white sphere, with projecting black ‘spikes’ encodes this otherwise haphazard set of roughly triangular 2D shapes (ﬁgure devised by Japanese vision
scientist Masonori Idesawa); (c) a virtual white ‘wire-frame’ cube encodes the 2D pattern of missing lines on the ﬁlled black circles; (d) the face-vase
illusion, devised a century ago by Danish psychologist, Edgar Rubin.
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nd Kubovy, 1986), the sphere-with-spines is constructed because it provides a simple explanation of the precise outlines
nd locations of the black shapes. Finally, the well-known Rubin vase, or face-vase stimulus (which can be perceived either
s a vase or as two faces in proﬁle), illustrates how the elements of a stimulus can be interpreted very differently, depending
n the ‘whole’ into which they are assimilated. Flipping between the face and vase interpretations involves changing which
art of the image is ‘ﬁgure’ and which is ‘ground.’ Given that the brain encodes ﬁgures in terms of convex ‘bumps’ rather
han concave ‘hollows’ (Hoffman and Richards, 1984), the features encoded in the face interpretation (nose, lips) are, on the
ase interpretation, not even encoded as parts of the stimulus at all, but as lying between these features. This stimulus is a
lassic illustration of different concepts from Gestalt psychology, including the idea (embodied in our model) that the brain
an only make sense of the world in one way at any point in time—that is, we see the face or the vase, but not both.
If the brain has a drive for sense-making, then it presumably requires some measure of how much sense different interpre-
ations make, whether these are interpretations of perceptual stimuli (see Fig. 1), or more abstract aspects of the environment.
arallel traditions in philosophy (Kemeny, 1953), psychology (Hochberg and McAlister, 1953), neuroscience (Blakemore,
993) and statistics (Rissanen, 1987 and Wallace and Freeman, 1987) have suggested that explanations can be viewed as
ncoding the data they seek to explain; that the complexity of an explanation, for a particular set of data, can be measured
y the length of the resulting code.
To get an intuitive sense of how the approach works, imagine our encoding language is English, and suppose that one
erson is attempting to describe the images in Fig. 1 with sufﬁcient precision that another person is able to recreate them.
o, in Fig. 1, high level descriptions, such as ‘there is a ﬁeld of different sized black blobs, with a pure white square in front,’
the eight vertices of a white wire frame cube are at the center of equal-sized black circles,’ or ‘a perfectly white sphere is
adiating black thorn-like cones in all directions,’ are likely to be much more useful than an attempt to describe the precise
utlines and locations of 2D black shapes. Of course, for the receiver of the message, the detail needs to be speciﬁed too;
ut it will be much more efﬁcient to ask about the size and location of the white square, the wire frame or the spines,
ather than focusing at the level of 2D outlines. The essence of the idea is that interpreting data by imposing some sense or
tructure helps the brain encode data efﬁciently; so we can invert this logic, and use the brevity of the encoding using that
nterpretation as a measure of the amount of sense that it makes of the data. It is then natural to assume that, other things
eing equal, the brain will prefer the briefest explanation that it can ﬁnd.
Though useful in driving intuitions, natural language is a poor choice for coding for a variety of reasons, most obviously
ecause of its imprecision and ambiguity, and less obviously because the very idea of code lengths in natural language
eads to paradoxes (e.g., the Berry paradox, Chaitin, 1995). To avoid these problems, it turns out that we can instead use a
rogramming language, in the sense used in computer science: such languages are precise, unambiguous and paradox-free;
nd appear, in principle, rich enough to express any well-deﬁned interpretation or structure. Indeed, the idea of measuring
he complexity of explanations by codes in a programming language is the core of a rich mathematical theory, Kolmogorov
omplexity (Li and Vitányi, 2009), which has a variety of psychological applications (e.g., Chater, 1999 and Chater and Vitányi,
003, 2007), and which provides a natural mathematical formulation of a widely used methodological principle, Occam’s
azor, of relevance to machine learning (Li et al., 2003; Li and Vitányi, 2009). In this paper, though, we  leave these technical
ssues concerning measures of code-lengths aside. We  focus instead on modeling how sense-making can function as a drive.
ere, we merely note that such quantiﬁcation of sense-making is both feasible and has been widely explored in prior work.
We have noted that the brain attempts to make sense of the world; that sense-making may  be measured by the simplicity
f the explanation of the data, and that simplicity may, in turn, be measured by code-length. Yet why  should there be a drive
or sense-making, as we argue in this paper? Indeed, why  should sense-making have any affective ‘valence’ or motivational
orce at all? Affective states are typically viewed as involved with motivation: we  seek pleasant, and avoid unpleasant,
ensations. But sense-making appears to operate autonomously, irrespective of conscious control or motivational state.
ndeed, the process of understanding the physical and social world is, to a large degree at least, a reﬂex (Fodor, 1983). Our
isual and auditory systems automatically make sense of sensory input; we cannot decide whether or not to understand what
eople are saying, or whether or not to go through the complex inferential processes required to recover their intentions
nd motives (e.g., Clark, 1996; Levinson, 2000), whether or not to appreciate the signiﬁcance of what we  are told, and so on.
ndeed, any lack of autonomy for such processes could be highly dangerous: if we had the ability to “see what we want to
ee,” in a literal, rather than a metaphorical sense, this would appear entirely to undermine the informational gathering role
f the senses. But to the extent that sense-making is autonomous, we might expect it to be affectively neutral—we do not
eed seem to require motivation to make sense of the world any more than we  need motivation to maintain our balance or
o blink when an object rapidly approaches our eyes.
We suggest that a drive for sense-making has an analogous function to that of other drives. Note that many internal, and
utomatic, biological processes have behavioral extensions. For example, temperature regulation in the human body relies
n a range of internal mechanisms such as blood ﬂow, piloerection, sweating, and so forth. There is no need to ‘feel hot’ or ‘feel
old’ in order to trigger changes in blood ﬂow or sweat production—indeed such changes are not under conscious control.
owever, people sometimes ﬁnd (or propel) themselves into environments in which internal processes are inadequate for
hermoregulation. In such situations, evolution has produced motivational mechanisms to induce us to take actions, either to
educe an aversive affective state or to enhance a positive one. Far from being automatic, such behaviors require deliberation:
e decide to turn on an air conditioner or put on a sweater or cover ourselves with a blanket. And our motivations concerning
emperature can compete with other motivations, such as saving money on fuel bills or wanting to look stylish. Similarly,
he drives associated with hunger and thirst motivate us to acquire and consume the “raw materials” upon which automatic
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processes of digestion and absorption operate; the occasional, but sometimes overwhelmingly powerful, drive to be able
to breathe will provide powerful motivation to come up for air when we  are diving or use an inhaler if we are suffering an
asthmatic attack, complementing autonomous respiratory processes.
We suggest, then, that sense-making processes may  be as automatic as digestion and respiration, but that, analogous to
these other drives, in some situations the motivational system is required in order to provide the appropriate materials upon
which these processes can operate. Although most sense-making mechanisms operate autonomously, without conscious
awareness or deliberate direction, in some situations, information processing alone is inadequate to transform disparate
information into simpler representations. In such situations, we  argue, our brains have evolved mechanisms to motivate
us to gather, attend to, and process information in a fashion that augments, and complements, autonomous sense-making.
Such actions can take the form of deliberate internal processes, such as searching memory or directing attention, or making
minimal actions, such as shifting one’s gaze, or actions varying in complexity from web  searches or to taking a course, hiring
a private detective or funding a research program. In short, we have a drive for sense-making because we frequently need
to direct and “feed” our automatic sense-making machinery appropriately.
Most drives, furthermore, operate via a carrot and stick. The stick is the aversive feeling which arises when the drive
is not met. One feels uncomfortable, for example, when one’s body temperature rises above, or falls below, the 98.6◦ F
set-point. The carrot is the pleasure of satisfying the drive, which intensiﬁes with the strength of the drive itself, a pattern
that psychologists call ‘aliesthesia’. Continuing with the temperature example, anything that helps to restore our body’s
temperature set-point, like putting one’s hand in cold water on a hot day, or in hot water on a cold day, feels good. The
drive for sense-making ﬁts such a pattern: The inability to make sense of stimuli, or for that matter of one’s life, is generally
aversive, and sense-making is especially pleasurable when the drive for sense-making has been activated. Thus, for example,
it is much more pleasurable to get the answer to a question if the question is asked ﬁrst, with a pause for one to come up
with the answer, than if the question and answer are delivered at the same moment in time (Hsee and Ruan, 2014).
Different drives have different triggers, some involving internal bodily states and some involving external stimuli. For
example, the strength of the sex drive at any point in time depends both on the body’s state (e.g., hormone levels, which,
in turn can depend on time of day, time of the month, and time since last sex), and external—e.g., visual—stimuli. The
drive for sense-making is, again, not an exception; its activation depends both on internal (cognitive) states and external,
informational, stimuli.
2.1. Four key features of sense-making
Several observations about sense-making and its connection to simpliﬁcation provide the foundation for our basic the-
oretical framework. The ﬁrst is that both sense and sense-making are pleasurable (and their opposites are aversive). So, for
example, the stimuli in Fig. 1 may  give us (an admittedly modest amount of) pleasure because we  have can make sense of
them successfully; and, in addition, the experience of sense-making is itself pleasurable: We  may  experience a momentary
positive ‘frisson’ when we suddenly ‘ﬁnd’ an elegant interpretation (the white square, the wire-frame cube, the white, spiny,
sphere, or the ‘faces in the vase’). Thus, as with contemporary theories of decision making which posit that people derive
utility both from outcome states and from changes (or deviations from reference points), sense-making is a function of
both levels (sense) and changes in the sense one has made (sense-making). Pleasure from sense captures, for example, both
the satisfaction of being able to tell a coherent story about our life, but also the satisfaction of gaining new information
that leads to a reﬁnement of that story. Ex ante, at least on average, we  should always expect new information to enhance
sense-making. However, this is not always the case. For example, a neat story one may  have told about one’s life could be
disrupted by the arrival of new information, leading to a negative change in sense and the opposite of sense-making. Indeed,
as we discuss below, fear of such order-disrupting information can lead to information avoidance and conﬁrmation bias.
The second principle is that not all sense-making is equally pleasurable. Some types of sense-making are more important
to us than others, and pleasure from sense-making (as well as pain from failures to make sense) depends critically on
importance. For example, it is far more pleasurable to make sense of one’s life than to solve a Sudoku puzzle or a crossword,
and it is more pleasurable to make sense of one’s own life than to make sense of someone else’s. We  gain still less pleasure
from aimlessly glancing around the room, or staring vaguely out of the window.
Some pieces of information are more important to us than others not merely because of the ‘interest’ of the topic, but
because they are a ‘key’ which allows us to provide a better explanation of many other things we may  be interested in.
So acquiring a small amount of new information might, in principle, substantially reduce the complexity of a wider body
of information. For example, ﬁnally discovering the perpetrator of a whodunit one has been immersed in for weeks is
typically more pleasurable than discovering the perpetrator at the end of a short-story, in part because the information
brings coherence to a lot more information in the former case than in the latter. And, of course, both of these are more
pleasurable than being told the identity of the criminal in a whodunit one has not read.
To account for such differences in our model, we  assume that sense and sense-making is, in fact, pleasurable or painful
to the extent that it does help us to make sense of aspects of our lives. Solving a Sudoku puzzle, by this assumption, will
be less satisfying than ﬁnding an explanation for a friend’s sudden coldness. Solving the Sudoku puzzle makes sense only
of the current stimulus, with few or no wider implications beyond the momentary situation. But a better understanding a
friend’s unexpected behavior may  have implications for much broader aspects of one’s life, such as the state of an important
on-going relationship. When two forms of potential sense-making are equally important to us, however, in the sense of
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hedding similar light on one’s life, then purely informational considerations will dictate their hedonic impact. Thus, for
xample, purely informational considerations should be able to explain why  we  get more pleasure from solving one Sudoku
uzzle than another, or from solving a Sudoku puzzle over playing a game of Tetris.
A third principle is that the pleasures and pains of sense and sense-making depend on expectations. Perhaps one distinc-
ive feature of the stimuli in Fig. 1 is that the degree of sense-making possible is unexpected: e.g., normally 2D shapes and
atches do not support such complex interpretations. In other situations, however, we  might go into a situation with high
xpectations of sense-making, but ﬁnd ourselves disappointed or frustrated. Prior research in diverse domains has found
hat pleasure and pain tends to result from comparison of attainments to reference points (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979),
hich are very often determined by expectations (Ko˝szegi and Rabin, 2006). We  propose that sense-making is no exception.
uch reference-dependence can explain why we ﬁnd stimuli aversive when they are surprisingly difﬁcult to make sense of
e.g., blurry images or text, mis-spellings, or even grammatical errors). Dependence on expectations appears to be required
o capture the fact that, in a museum, we derive no pleasure or pain from the blank walls between paintings because we
on’t have any expectations that sense is to be found in these expanses. Likewise, the feeling that there is sense to be made,
ut we are unable to make it, can be agonizing, as exempliﬁed by people who fruitlessly ruminate about key events in their
ives, in a futile effort to make sense of them.
A fourth principle is that the pleasures and pains of sense-making are not symmetric. Consistent with the notion of loss
version (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) and the more general phenomenon that the bad tends to be stronger than the
ood (Baumeister et al., 2001), negative deviations from expectations tend to be more aversive than positive deviations
re pleasant. Thus, believing one has made sense of a situation, but then discovering one has not, is an overall aversive
xperience, despite the fact that one is left in the same situation in which one began. Likewise, receiving information that
hallenges the sense one has made of the world, but then having that information discredited, leaves one worse off (albeit
artly due to new appreciation of the fragility of the sense one has made) than one was  at the outset.
. A simple model of sense-making
We  suppose that there is a psychological distinction between knowledge about aspects of our lives, K, that we are at any
iven moment attempting to explain; and general background knowledge, B, e.g., about the physical and social world. That
s, K, represents the information that the brain is currently trying to make sense of, and which, depending one’s theoretical
erspective, may  be viewed as the current content of working memory and/or as the focus of attention. By contrast, we
an think of B as the contents of long-term memory. This boundary is, as we  shall see, ﬂexible. At one moment, we may
e focusing purely on the interpretation of a visual stimulus, such as those in Fig. 1, so that K may  be limited to current
erceptual input; at another moment, we may  reﬂect on how our life, or our relationships, are progressing, so that the
nowledge that we are attempting to explain is far broader. We  suggest, though, that we are only able to explain some
ubset of our knowledge of our lives, K, at any moment; we treat anything else that we know as part of our background
nowledge, B.1
We  propose that people form the explanation, e(K|B), of the to-be-explained knowledge, K, which best ﬁts that knowledge,
iven the background knowledge B. We  assume that the process of inferring this explanation is independent of their evalua-
ions of their lives, just as it is typically assumed in perception that the favored perceptual interpretation is autonomous and
ence independent of the goals of an agent (e.g., Fodor, 1983; Pylyshyn, 1999).2 For clarity, and in line with the observation
oncerning perceptual organization that people can only entertain a single explanation of a sensory input (e.g., the face/vase
f Fig. 1) or of their life at any moment, we assume that e(K|B) corresponds to the single simplest explanation or construal
f K, rather than a probability distribution over construals.
Thus,
e(K |B) = arg min
e′
C
(
e′, K |B
)
, (1)here C(e′, K|B) is the code-length for encoding knowledge, K, using explanation e′ based on background knowledge B. This
erm itself can be expressed as the sum of the code-length of the explanation e′ itself, C(e′|B), and the code-length required
o specify knowledge K given the explanation, C(K|e′, B). That is, C(e′, K|B) = C(e′|B) + C(K|e′, B). A preferred explanation will
1 As our attentional focus shifts, the boundary between the information that we are attempt to explain, K, and the background knowledge that we
resuppose, B, may  change in important ways. For example, while we may  momentarily be attempting to make sense of the immediate actions of the
haracters in a work of literature, ﬁlm or play (so that the relevant K, in the moment, is quite narrow), it may  be that when we  shift our attention to think
bout  our own  life, the people around us, or our society (i.e., we  now shift to a much broader K), the analysis of the work of art has changed our interpretation
f  these much broader aspects of our lives. As we  note below, it seems plausible that we ﬁnd experiences or works of art for which sense-making is purely
nternal to the experience or work to be “shallow.” By contrast, “deep” experiences and works of art seem to be those which can change how we make sense
f  other aspects of our lives. For example, solving a Sudoku problem presumably has no wider implications beyond the stimulus itself and thus seems a
uperﬁcial pleasure. Reading a great novel may, by contrast, feel “deep” if we suspect that it may  reshape or enrich our view of human nature and perhaps
ven  ourselves. This type of analysis is consonant with Mill’s attempt (1859), contra Bentham (1825), to distinguish between the pleasures of pushpin and
oetry.
2 Although a useful simpliﬁcation, this may  be unrealistic. There is a wealth of research in psychology that appears to show that even our most basic
erceptions are affected by motivational factors such as drives, goals and desires.
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Source: Fukushima (2001).
be itself simple (as measured by the code-length C(e′|B) but also accurate, hence providing a simple code for the knowledge
the individual seeks to encode, as measured by C(K|e′, B). This is a foundational assumption of our model of sense-making:
Given background knowledge, the autonomous process prefers the simplest explanation of the to-be-explained information,
K, that it can ﬁnd. This is a difﬁcult optimization problem—indeed, in general it is uncomputable; that is, no computable
process can map  sets of data into their shortest descriptions. But this is not unexpected—the problem of making best sense
of our environment is inevitably an open-ended problem, closely related to creating the best possible science.
Now, suppose that we learn a new piece of information that might potentially modify our construal of the knowledge, K,
that we are trying to make sense of. We  model this by adding a new piece of information, a, to our background knowledge,
which then becomes B ∪ {a}. Now, our best construal of our life, in the light of a, written e(K|B ∪ {a}), is:
e(K |B ∪ {a}) = arg min
e′
C(e′, K |B ∪ {a}) (2)
It could, of course, be that a is irrelevant to making sense of what we know of our life (the knowledge, K), and so the best
choice of construal remains unchanged (i.e., e(K|B ∪ {a}) = e(K|B)). But it is also possible that a leads to some updating of the
best construal. For example, getting some positive (or negative) teaching feedback may  make us re-construe past, perhaps
somewhat ambiguous, remarks about our teaching performance; learning a medical fact might require us to reinterpret
some symptoms we have been experiencing; and so on.
Just as in science, a single piece of information (a crucial observation or experiment) can change our current choice of
best ‘theory.’ Indeed, even without any new information, we  may  ﬁnd ourselves ‘ﬂipping’ between two roughly equally good
interpretations. We  might, for example, oscillate from feeling genuine conﬁdence in our abilities and suspicion that other
people are giving us apparently positive feedback only out of kindness; between believing that our company strategy will
win new customers and fearing that it will fail hopelessly; and so on. In such cases, there may  be little evidence available to
decide between interpretations.
This type of ‘Gestalt switch’ is illustrated in the Necker Cube (Fig. 1, where we  alternately interpret the cube as tilted
downwards to the left or upwards to the right) and face-vase illusion (also in Fig. 1); and it often discussed in the philosophy
of science (e.g., Kuhn, 1962, Schefﬂer, 1972; Wright, 1992). For this reason, the best explanation is not, strictly, a function of
the relevant knowledge to be explained, K, and background knowledge, B, because the same knowledge can lead to different
interpretations (whereas a function, of course, can only map one input onto a single output). Nonetheless, purely to keep
our notation simple below, we will ignore the possibility of such spontaneous ‘ﬂips’ and suppose that the brain chooses a
single best construal or explanation e of knowledge, K, given background B, so that we will write the best construal e as a
function e(K|B) of the relevant knowledge.
Now, on learning a, the complexity of our new best explanation (C(e′, K|B ∪ {a})) may  be more or less than the complexity
of our previous explanation, C(e′, K|B). For example, suppose that K concerns relevant aspect of our visual input, when looking
at the stimuli shown in Fig. 2.
You may  have spotted the hidden pattern (take a moment to see if you can ﬁnd it). But if not, considering the additional
piece of information a = “these are the ﬁrst six letters of the alphabet, in block capitals.” With this information in mind,
these patterns suddenly become easier to make sense of. And, of course, according to this interpretation, the code for the
stimuli, K, will be far shorter. For example, imagine trying to convey these shapes by a written description: once we have
the ‘key’ that these are block capital letters, with various occlusions, it becomes possible to encode them reasonably brieﬂy,
by describing the color, thickness, and font of the letters and then describing the sizes of centers of the ‘white’ circles, lines,
and so on, that overlay them (notice to express this code, we need to draw on background knowledge, B, about the letters of
the alphabet, fonts, colors, shapes, and so on). By contrast, describing them purely as highly irregular patterns will require
an extremely long and convoluted description. So, with the ‘hint’ a, that the stimulus is a sequence of letters, the code for K
becomes far simpler, and hence makes far more sense: that is, our estimate of C(e′,K|B∪{a})) is much less than our estimate
of C(e′,K|B))—only with the hint can we make sense of the stimulus.3
3 Indeed, in this case, a stronger condition may  be true: that the best explanation e′ , for K, may  actually include the ‘additional’ information a. If so, by
choosing the best explanation, we automatically postulate that a is true—in principle at least, it does not need to be given as a hint: it is ‘implicit’ within
the  (best explanation of the) data itself. Of course, even in this situation, the hint may  be required for us to ﬁnd the explanation. So, when looking at Fig. 2,
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While adding new information, a, to our background knowledge, B, typically makes our encoding of the data more efﬁcient,
he opposite is also possible. We might, for example, be told that the patterns in Fig. 2 are markings on a tablet from Ancient
gypt, or images picked up from a scan of the sea-bed. If these assertions were sufﬁciently credible, then we would need to
ettison our apparently efﬁcient encoding (though it might still help us remember the patterns), because it is inconsistent
ith our background knowledge (there was no Latin alphabet in Ancient Egypt, and so on).
How, does simplicity relate to sense-making? We  propose that the amount of sense that we  make of knowledge about
ome aspect our lives, K, or any other body of information, is inversely related to the complexity of the explanation we are
ble to create. The brain is continually seeking the simplest explanation, and hence the explanation corresponding to the
hortest code.
S(e(K |B) = f (−C(e, K |B)), (3)
here f is a strictly positive monotonic function.4 It follows immediately that the explanation that minimizes code length,
s the same as the code which maximizes the degree of sense-making:
e(K |B) = arg max
e′
S(e′, K |B) = arg min
e′
C(e′, K |B) (4)
ere, we have developed a model of how the brain attempts to ﬁnd the explanation to make the most sense of given
nformation, whether a momentary sensory input, or our knowledge of our entire life, in light of background information.
ense-making is related to the simplicity by which the given information can be encoded—the brain seeks the simplest
xplanation that it can. If we have a drive for sense-making, then it is natural to conjecture, as we  have noted above, that
ense-making, i.e., ﬁnding simpler explanations, should be pleasurable; and the opposite should be aversive. But, of course,
hen we explain our lives, or encounter new information that might modify such explanations, we  are not concerned only
ith the degree of sense-making; we are also concerned with what the current sense we have made, e(K|B), says about how
ur life is going. Sense-making might, in principle, lead us to a wonderfully compact explanation of our lives as consisting of
elentless calamity. In short, sense-making is not our only drive or motivation. In the next section we consider how sense-
aking can be combined with other factors—lumping together all such other factors into a single quantity of utility, for
nalytical tractability.
.1. Sense-making and utility
An explanation, e(K|B), of our lives may  paint our lives in a good or a poor light and may  suggest a rosy or gloomy future
n the light of the aspects of our life, K, that we are thinking about. Of course, if K refers to something extremely speciﬁc, such
s the immediate sensory input, then the explanation e(K|B) may  have no signiﬁcant implications for our lives at all. But
ften the information, K, that we are trying to explain will concern our own  behavior or performance, our relationships with
igniﬁcant people in our lives, and so on. In these cases, which explanation we settle on may  have substantial implications
or our evaluation of our lives. Let us call a person’s evaluation of how positively (or negatively) some aspect of life, K, is
oing, V(e(K|B)), paralleling the term introduced above for much sense they can make of their life, S(e(K|B)).
We assume that individuals pursue two corresponding goals: (1) to view their world and their life as positively as possible,
nd (2) to make maximal sense of their lives. We assume that a person’s “absolute” utility, UA(e|K, B), depends on the absolute
aluation of their life and the absolute amount of sense they can make of it:
UA(e(K |B)) = +UA(V(e(K |B)), S(e(K |B))) (5)
We  make the further natural assumption that UA(e(K|B)) is increasing in both arguments.
But absolute utility, UA, is only part of the story. Following Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006), we  allow that people’s overall utility
epends both on absolute utility and on how the components of this utility depart from expectations. That is, we assume
hat people care separately about whether their construal, e(K|B) of their life is becoming more or less positive; and whether
t implies that their life is making more or less sense.
If changes relative to expectations are key, as in the Ko˝szegi-Rabin framework, then a person will care about the degree
o which, after learning new information a (so that her background knowledge is now B ∪ {a}), her life is better or worse
han its prior value, given her previous background knowledge state B. We  call this reference-dependent value term, VR, and
rite:
VR(e(K |B ∪ {a})) = V (V(e(K |B ∪ {a})) − V(e(K |B))), (6)
he hint may  not be required for us to realize that panels represent the ﬁrst six letters of the alphabet. This stronger condition is of particular interest in
erception (e.g., Chater, 2005), but is not our focus below.
4 Below we do not place any explanatory burden on the functional form of f, so we could take it to be the identity function. It is possible that a more
omplex form for f may  be theoretically useful in some contexts.
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where V is a loss-averse value function of the type used in prospect theory (i.e., concave in gains, convex in losses, and
where losses loom larger than the corresponding gains, Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Similarly, a reference-dependent
sense-making term, SR, i.e., the change in the degree to which life makes sense in the light of a, can be written:
SR(e(K |B ∪ {a})) = S(S(e(K |B ∪ {a})) − S(e(K |B))), (7)
where S is similar a loss-averse value function of the same general form. Loss aversion has, of course, important implications
for the impact of information. For example, if a brings bad news concerning one’s evaluation of how one’s life is going (e.g.,
poor teaching ratings, a failed grant application, or a share price collapse) and/or makes one’s life make less sense (e.g., one
learns that a cherished story about one’s childhood is, in fact, probably a false memory), then one’s absolute utility will
be reduced. That is, our absolutely utility will fall from UA(e(K|B)) to a lower value UA(e(K|B ∪ a)). But if one subsequently
discovers that a is entirely false—e.g., the person from whom we  overheard this information was actually talking about
someone else entirely, other things being equal, the absolute utility term will now return to its previous value, UA(e(K|B)).5
However, due to loss aversion, the changes in the reference-dependent value and sense-making terms, VR and SR will not
‘cancel out’ when a is ﬁrst added and then rescinded. Whether a increases or decreases value or sense, its being discredited
will always leave one worse off than prior to receipt of the information, because, due to loss aversion, the negative change
will always outweigh the positive one. This ﬁts, for example, our intuition that experiencing a fear which then turns out to
be unfounded is, overall, a negative experience, or that hearing good news which turns out to be illusory, is also unpleasant
overall.
Valuation and sense-making will often move in opposite directions upon the receipt of new information. For example,
news of one’s child’s arrest for narcotics possession might help to make sense of a wide range of otherwise incomprehensible
information (e.g., why his moods were so erratic), thus raising S, but would certainly have a negative impact on V. In contrast,
learning that someone you suspected might dislike you had dedicated a book to you might ﬁll you with pleasure, yet disrupt
the neat sense you had made of your relationship with the individual. The fact that information can often have opposite
effects on sense-making and value might also help to explain the common observation that, after receiving long-anticipated
news that turns out to be bad, we can sometimes have a strong feeling of relief: Perhaps this feeling arises because, though
the outcome is not what we had hoped for, the certainty of our knowledge puts us back in a position to make sense of
our lives. More broadly, such ‘bitter-sweet’ reactions, which seem a ubiquitous part of human experience, seem to require
explanation in terms of potentially antagonistic forces, such as optimizing V and S, and are difﬁcult to understand in any
unitary account (e.g., where we are interested only in optimizing V).
Overall or total utility, UT, in the light of new information a, is an increasing function of three quantities: the absolute
utility of the state when a is known (itself depending on valuation and sense-making), and the two  reference-dependent
terms:
UT (K, a|B) = +UT {UA(e(K |B ∪ {a})), VR(e(K |B ∪ {a})), SR(e(K |B ∪ {a}))}, (8)
or, more compactly,
UT (a) = +UT {UA(a), VR(a), SR(a)}, (9)
where UT(a), the total utility after learning new information a, is assumed to be increasing in each of the three arguments.
For simplicity, we can, though we need not, assume these utility terms are additive, so that our total utility term UT, in the
light of data a, can be written:
UT (a) = ˛UA(a) + ˇVR(a) + SR(a), (10)
where ˛, ˇ, and  are constants. Here, the “reference” level for valence and sense-making, V(e(K)) and S(e(K)) is determined
before the new information a is known.
In the model just described, as a result of reference-dependence, expectations matter critically. For example, we should
ﬁnd it aversive, if we expected to ﬁnally learn the identity of the criminal in the last episode of an extended TV series,
to discover that the anticipated information is not forthcoming (perhaps because the producers decided to add a second
season). If the ﬁnal episode did promise to reveal the perpetrator, moreover, but our cable connection failed at the crucial
moment of revelation, our frustration would likely be even more profound.
4. Applications
In prior sections, we outlined an account of a drive for sense-making, explained how an account of sense-making can be
integrated into existing accounts of utility and decision making, and ﬁnally explored how sense-making may  be important
in understanding how we assess the value of new information. In this section, we  show how the drive for sense-making,
and the speciﬁc theoretical perspective just outlined, can help to make sense of a wide range of disparate phenomena.
5 Of course there might be secondary effects, such as admonishing oneself for jumping to conclusions.
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.1. Curiosity
Curiosity is, perhaps, the most obvious application of our theoretical framework. Curiosity, by deﬁnition, refers to intrin-
ically motivated seeking after information—i.e., in the absence of anticipated material payoffs, or more broadly, where the
nformation we  are ‘curious’ about has no implications for our evaluation V of our lives. In our framework, curiosity can be
asily understood as a manifestation of the drive for sense-making.
Curiosity in our framework could arise in two  situations. In the ﬁrst, an individual might get new information but be
nable to make sense of it. In that case, curiosity would be focused on the desire for information that could make sense
f the new information. Thus, for example, the website ‘Upworthy’ presents visitors with a series of headlines such as “If
ou Have To Tell Your Kids This Stuff, Then You Probably Aren’t A White Person,” and “Some Think It’s Just Plain Kinky,
ut The Amount Of Trust This Lifestyle Takes Is Staggering,” which evoke curiosity by presenting intriguing but confusing
nformation that, the visitor is implicitly promised, can be made sense of by clicking on the link.
In the second case, curiousity is triggered by the perception that new information could help to make sense of existing,
tored, information. A scientist, for example, would be tremendously curious to learn about a new theory that could make
ense of otherwise disparate, unorganized data in his or her ﬁeld, and would also be curious to obtain new information which,
ntegrated with the existing data, might result in such a comprehensive understanding. Similarly, a person may  research
heir family history in the hope of ‘making sense’ of their lives; read about 19th century Russian history to try to ‘make
etter sense’ of much loved Russian novels; or pore over a map  of a location where they have been on a walking holiday, to
nderstand the terrain. Note, too, that curiosity about ﬁctional stories, which may  be powerful enough to keep us reading
r watching for many hours, can be understood in terms of the sense-making term, S, but ﬁctional events typically do not,
f course, have direct implication for our valuation, V, of our own lives.
A literature review by one of the authors (Loewenstein, 1994) proposed that curiosity derives from “an information gap”
hat becomes salient to the curious individual, and identiﬁed four key properties of curiosity that any theory should seek
o address: (1) its intensity, (2) transience and dependence on immediate stimulus, (3) association with impulsivity, and
4) tendency to disappoint when satisﬁed. In our formulation, curiosity arises from such a gap, deﬁned by the comparison
etween the amount of simpliﬁcation occurring at a moment in time and the amount of simpliﬁcation that is deemed to be
mmediately possible. Curiosity may, of course, be unsatisﬁed if we  are unable to perform the relevant action (e.g., clicking
he link, asking a person a key question, peering to see what someone is reading, and so on), in which case we  would expect
he curiosity to be replaced with, or at least mixed with, frustration.
Loss aversion, in our model, helps to explain curiosity’s intensity; loss aversion means that people will be especially
trongly motivated to engage in sense-making when they perceive a gap between how much sense-making they have
chieved and how much they believe could be achieved.
Curiosity’s transience and dependence on immediate stimuli, in our model, can be explained by the transience of expec-
ations of sense-making (which serves as the reference level in our model). The classic example of curiosity’s transience is
hen one is walking behind someone and becomes curious of what they look like from the front; as soon as they turn the
orner and disappear, curiosity tends to vanish almost instantly. Such a pattern is well explained by an account in which the
ndividual’s disappearance virtually eliminates the potential to obtain the missing perspective, thus altering expectations
nd curiosity.
Curiosity’s association with impulsivity is easily addressed by the proposal that sense-making is a drive, similar to hunger,
hirst and sexual desire, all of which are commonly associated with impulsive behavior. Drives tend to naturally increase
ne’s preference for drive-related consumption (indeed, that is their very function), but future drive levels are uncertain. So
mmediate drives tend to promote immediate consumption, and the drive for sense-making is no exception, except that the
consumption’, in its case, involves information acquisition.
Finally, the tendency to disappoint when satisﬁed is also explained by loss aversion, which ampliﬁes an individual’s
otivation to obtain information (“wanting,” to use terminology proposed by Berridge, 1996) without necessarily having a
ommensurate impact on pleasure from obtaining the information (“liking,” in Berridge’s terminology).
.2. Boredom
Boredom, in our framework, arises from the absence of sense-making and the comparison of this paucity of sense-making
o some higher baseline point of reference the negative feeling associated with the inability to engage in sense-making.
oredom has two elements. First, we have the feeling that there are no actions, Q, that we  can take that are likely to lead to
nformation, a, that will help us make sense of any information, K, that we are interested in. So, when considering actions,
, which might lead to such data, we suspect that
〈
SR(e(K |B ∪ {a}))
〉
Q
is low. This might arise if, for example, we are in a
aiting room stocked with magazines detailing the lives of celebrities we care nothing about; if we are stuck a hotel with
nly the prospect of futile channel-hopping; if we come to a halt in a railway tunnel and all we can scan from the window is
he reﬂection of our empty carriage; or if we are stuck in an unchallenging and repetitive job, from which we are learning
othing new.
There is a second element of boredom: that there is no prospect of shifting our attention to some new K which we can
ake sense of. Thus, we can sometime stave off boredom, by viewing our environment in a different way: e.g., wondering
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whether celebrity magazines may  be telling us something about the human condition; comparing the news agenda from
different channels; puzzling about the explanation of the double-reﬂections in carriage windows; or thinking about last
night’s exciting TV drama during a day of repetitive work. But attempting to shift K is effortful, and may  be impossible if, for
example, on a conference call we need to pay attention to what is said. In short, then, we  are bored when our drive for sense
making is thwarted, and there is nothing we can do, either by our actions, a, or by changing the ‘topic’ K, to ﬁnd anything
that we both want to, and are able to, make sense of.
This account of boredom is closely related to, but distinct from, a recent “opportunity cost” account of boredom which sees
boredom as closely related to the feeling of mental effort (Kurzban et al., 2013). In this alternative account, the “sensation
of ‘mental effort’ is the output of mechanisms designed to measure the opportunity cost of engaging in the current mental
task. According to this alternative account the key to whether an activity is boring (or mentally effortful) is whether the task
in question is seen as valuable.
Our analysis of boredom is different from the opportunity cost account. First, our account does not view boredom as
related to a negative feeling of mental effort. According to our account, we  can be bored while experiencing no feeling of
mental effort—indeed, this is typically the case when our context and task is under-stimulating or repetitive. Conversely, we
can feel a strong sense of mental effort, e.g., when solving a cross-word puzzle or Sudoku, even though the task clearly has no
extrinsic ‘value’ and is a purely an entertainment. Indeed, were this not the case, such effortful pastimes would presumably
universally be perceived as boring, and their vast popularity would be mysterious. Moreover, our account also does not
predict that the feeling that a task is valuable will decrease one’s boredom with it—so a task such a detecting very rare
signals of enemy aircraft on a radar monitor may be recognized as vitally important but also as dreadfully boring. Instead,
the key determinant of boredom according to our account is the (in)ability to engage in sense-making.
Both accounts can make sense of some salient ‘facts’ about boredom. One is that tasks that require minimal amounts of
attention can be more boring than tasks that don’t require any attention (e.g., staring at a blank wall). Both theories can
account for this observation by noting that tasks which don’t require attention allow for mind-wandering (in our account,
actively changing K), to something that can be very much associated with sense-making—e.g., thinking about a story, a
puzzle or one’s own life. Another interesting fact about boredom is that people rarely report being bored when trying to
go to sleep, even unsuccessfully—this is especially puzzling, given that attempts at sleep typically involve minimal sensory
stimulation. Our account of boredom would explain this observation by noting that expectations about sense-making, and
hence the appropriate reference points, are likely to be very low in this situation; the period before sleep is not typically a
time of substantial sense-making, probably by evolutionary design, so there is no expectation that sense will be made and
hence no unfavorable comparison with actual sense-making.
4.3. Flow, and the short-circuiting of sense-making
‘Flow’ (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990) refers to a state of concentration or complete absorption with an activity one is engaged
in. Flow is the antithesis of both boredom and curiosity, in its determinants, consequences, and in the feelings it evokes.
Contrary to boredom, ﬂow is associated with high levels of sense-making and contrary to curiosity, there is no craving for
missing information. In our account, expected sense making is high; and such expectations are typically achieved.
Flow is generally seen as a good thing, but people can, and often do, experience ﬂow when engaged in activities that
are difﬁcult to construe as beneﬁcial to them. Most drives can be effectively short-circuited by products and activities that
activate, and appear to satisfy, the drive while providing little sustained beneﬁt. The concept of ‘empty calories’ from fast
food that, through the introduction of salt and fat, appeals to our evolutionary programming but yields little real nutritional
beneﬁt is a paradigmatic example; internet pornography is another. Modern electronic game makers provide the analog to
these examples when it comes to sense-making. Games like “Angry Birds” give the brain the perception of continual sense-
making, even though the sense that is made fails to add up to anything useful. As we indicated above, the popularity of Sudoku
and crosswords, as well as other pastimes including jigsaw puzzles, word- and picture-search, spot-the-difference problems,
and logic problems, as well as domestic ‘organizing’ activities without obvious practical function, such as gardening, stamp
and coin collecting, and many art and craft leisure activities, suggests that creating an organized environment (and hence
an environment which we can readily make sense of) is intrinsically rewarding.
4.4. Conﬁrmation bias
Piaget (1954) drew a contrast between two  ways of responding to information: assimilation, which involves making
sense of the information in light of existing explanations of the world, and accommodation, which involves adapting such
explanations to take account of new, incongruent, information. Relatedly, Kuhn, in the Structure of Scientiﬁc Revolution (1970),
proposed that science doesn’t progress in a continuous fashion, but in discontinuous jumps: in essence, when assimilation of
new data to the existing framework is replaced by accommodating new data by the creation of a new theoretical framework.
But, both in cognitive development and in science, shifting to a new framework—i.e., accommodating rather than merely
assimilating—is not undertaken lightly. Indeed, there can even be active resistance to the need for a new framework—as
captured by the physicist Max  Planck’s famous quip that “Science advances one funeral at a time.”
‘Conﬁrmation bias’ (e.g., Nickerson, 1998) is closely related to these phenomena. It refers to the tendency for people to
seek out and interpret information in a fashion that tends to support existing beliefs, rather than requiring those beliefs to be
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pdated. Conﬁrmation bias is well documented experimentally and in real-world settings, but its origins and motivational
nderpinnings have been much less studied.
One reason that the brain is likely to stick with existing explanations of knowledge, K, is simply that ﬁnding alternative
etter models is difﬁcult. According to our approach, we can only entertain one explanation, e, of information K, at a time; and
he natural way to search for better explanations, e′, is by making local adjustments to the current explanation. Indeed, most
odels of learning in the brain and cognitive sciences involve a highly local search for better ‘models’ (e.g., using gradient
escent or some stochastic generalization, Dayan and Abbott, 2001; Rumelhart and McClelland, 1986). So, if the brain locally
earches the space of explanations, then we should anticipate a degree of inertia or ‘stickiness’ with regard to existing
xplanations. For this reason, we should expect people to become, to some extent, “stuck” in particular interpretations of
n ambiguous image (e.g., the Rubin face-vase stimulus of Fig. 1), yet occasionally ﬂipping their interpretation abruptly.
While important, the ‘inertia through local search’ style of explanation is far from a complete account. In particular,
t does not explain the active resistance to new explanations (and, indeed, active dismissal of apparently awkward data)
entioned above. Our account provides an explanation of this motivation. When considering a particular set of data K, a new
xplanation e′ may  appear superior to our current explanation e. But if e′ has wide application to other aspects of our life,
hen by accepting e′ we may  be committed to rethinking may  other things, K′, K′′, K′′′. And before we  do so, we  do not know
hether these aspects of our life will make us feel better about ourselves or worse about ourselves; or whether our lives
ill make more sense, or less sense. To the extent that losses loom larger than gains in the context both of valuations, V, and
ense-making S, (captured in our model by the fact that changes in both with respect to the reference point are modulated by
rospect-theory style functions V and S), we should expect people to be averse to such re-thinking: the fear of the result
f rethinking having negative consequences is likely to outweigh the possibility that it may  have positive consequences.
We suspect that the sense-making term, S, may  play a key role for two  reasons. First, people are often resistant to
ew knowledge, and consequent explanatory change in domains which appear irrelevant to their evaluation of their own
ives—e.g., while acting as jurors in a court case (Nickerson, 1998). Second, people typically experience a period of disorien-
ation before existing facts are fully assimilated into the new explanation, during which they have a feeling that the facts,
r even their lives, no longer make sense. Such temporary loss of ‘sense-making’ is, as we  would expect, often highly aver-
ive. Atherton (1999, p. 88), in a paper on “resistance to learning,” drew a distinction between “additive” and ‘supplantive’
earning (similar to Piaget’s between assimilation and accommodation) and suggested that resistance to the latter is greater
ecause of its accompanying element of loss:
“The depression and confusion experienced by people experiencing supplantive learning follows a very similar pattern
o that of those passing through crises [. . .]. Having been de-stabilised, they pass through a period of disorientation,  from
hich they emerge to re-orientation.”
.5. Information-avoidance
Although closely related to conﬁrmation bias, information avoidance is worthy of separate treatment because our model
rovides a novel account of how and why it occurs. Information avoidance presents a kind of paradox because, at some level,
o avoid information selectively one has to have at least some idea about the content of the information. If expectations are
nbiased, moreover, then positive surprises should be as likely as negative surprises. So one might suppose that the prospect
f good or bad news would balance out and that there would be no particular reason to avoid information.
Different accounts of information avoidance have been proposed. One account, based on disappointment aversion
Ko˝szegi, 2003, 2010), which is closely related to loss aversion and reference-dependence in our model, posits that neg-
tive surprises are more unpleasant than positive surprises are pleasant—our account embodies this insight as we shall see
elow. Another (Oster et al., 2013) assumes that people adopt optimistic expectations, but are aware at some level that they
re doing so, and so avoid information to protect themselves against having their unrealistic expectations get shattered.
et a third (Karlsson et al., 2009) proposes that knowing something deﬁnitively has a greater impact on utility than simply
uspecting something; when information is expected to be adverse, this ‘impact effect’ motivates information avoidance.6
Our theoretical perspective provides a related but somewhat different interpretation from these existing accounts. Note,
rst that the autonomy of the information process system, in ﬁnding the simplest explanation of the data which it is currently
rocessing—i.e., maximizing the sense-making term, S, implies that we  cannot directly inﬂuence our construal of our lives to
mprove the value term V. We  are not able, for example, simply able to willingly misperceive, i.e., to misread, our teaching
atings as a collection of 9s and 10s, when they are actually 2s and 3s. Similarly, we  are not able willfully to tells ourselves,
alsely, that 1 represents the ‘top’ of the scale and ‘10’ the bottom; or alternatively that most of our colleagues will be rated
s straight 1s, so that 2s and 3s represent a strong performance. The autonomy of the sense-making system requires that we
now bad news when we see it, which is likely of crucial evolutionary importance: Were we able to shape our perception
f the world to maximize V, not S, then rather than creating a model of the world that made the most of the available
nformation, we would create a ‘happy dream’ unconnected to the external world.
But, though the deliberative system cannot inﬂuence the autonomous system directly, it can do so indirectly—by affecting
hat information the autonomous system has available to process. So, while the ‘digestive processes’ of the sense-making
6 See Golman et al. (2016) for a review of evidence, strategies, and theoretical accounts of information avoidance.
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system may  be autonomous, and outside the inﬂuence of the aim of optimizing value, its ‘diet’ is not. In particular, we  can
decide to avoid sources of information that we suspect may  lead us to bad evaluations V of how our lives are going, and,
given the severe attentional limits of the cognitive system, we can also selectively decide what information to pay attention
to from the vast amount of information available to us. So, while we cannot decide to misread our teaching ratings in order
to maintain our positive mood and preserve a positive self-image, we can decide not to look at the ratings further; or, if we
have glanced at them, and noticed an alarming number of apparently low scores, we can avert our eyes, put them into the
recycling bin, and vow inwardly to think no more about them.
For similar reasons, we may  also avoid sources of information that may  threaten to disturb our current explanations.
Typically, of course, learning more information, if it is relevant at all, is likely to help us understand the world better (e.g.,
think about the hint about the alphabet in Fig. 2). Although it is possible that new information may  undermine our current
understanding (e.g., learning that the Fig. 2 comes from Ancient Egypt, so that the Latin alphabet cannot help explain the
pattern), the receipt of information that decreases sense-making is likely fairly rare. Indeed, there is a well-known theorem
in the mathematical theory of coding (Cover and Thomas, 1991), which states that the expected code-length of a set of data,
in the light of information, a, from any observation or experiment, A, cannot be greater than the initial code-length:
C(K |B) ≥
〈
C(K |B ∪ {a})
〉
a ∈ A (11)
If we assume that sense-making is merely the inverse of code-length (i.e., f in Eq. (3) is the identity function), then this
would imply that any experiment or observation will, in expectation, improve sense-making. Note, though, that, as with
valuation, any change in sense-making is assessed using a prospect-theory style value function, S, in which losses loom
larger than gains.
For this reason, it is entirely possible that, for some possible observations or experiments, A:
S(S(K |B)) >
〈
S(S(K |B ∪ {a}))
〉
a ∈ A (12)
That is, the expected utility from a change in sense-making may  be negative for some experiments or observations—and
hence these are sources of information that we will be motivated to avoid. An academic who has developed a particular
theory, for example, might stop running critical experiments that could challenge the theory. Presumably, if the academic
truly believes the theory, new data should be much more likely to support the theory than to refute it; however the down-side
of the latter could easily more than outweigh the more probable but smaller upside of the former.
In this type of case, avoiding subjecting one’s theory to a really rigorous test may  be motivated both by the desire to avoid
both a reduction in sense-making and a reduction in one’s evaluation of one’s life—if, for example, one’s sense of self-worth
is connected to the validity of the theory. In more common situations, however, these two motives are likely to be pitted
against one-another. Generally, important new information will tend to simplify the encoding of current information, as we
have seen in Eq. (11). So, other things being equal, one might expect that gathering new information will generally improve
sense-making. But the anticipated impact of new information on value, in contrast, has a neutral expected value
〈
V(e(K |B ∪ {a})) − V(e(K |B))
〉
a ∈ A = 0 (13)
From the point of view of absolute value, one should feel entirely indifferent about whether to obtain new
information—losses and gains will balance out. But, because losses loom larger than gains, the expectation of VR term
will typically be negative (although the curvature of the value function, V will also matter—e.g., there may  be a positive
expected evaluation where for example, there is a high probability of mildly good news, and a small probability of very bad
news. So, for example, one might want to know the results of an exam where one is almost sure one has passed).
The choice of whether to look or not at an information source, therefore, is likely to depend on the balance between the
typically positive expectation of the SR term and the typically negative expectation of the VR term. Whether we  choose to
look at our teaching ratings, investigate whether our spouse is having an affair, or whether our child is engaged in illegal
activities, will depend on whether curiosity overcomes trepidation, and the most common conﬂicted pattern will be to seek
information that we strongly suspect will make us miserable (Kruger and Evans, 2009).
There is, of course, a further impetus to sample information: Learning new information may  help to inform decision
making and allow us to change our actions in beneﬁcial ways. Although new information can, by ill luck, sometimes lead us to
switch to worse decision options, the expected quality of decisions should never fall after the receipt of new information (for
a relevant formal result, see Juslin et al., 2006). In general, therefore, psychological factors that lead us to avoid information
will tend to have a negative impact on decision quality. For example, suspecting that her teaching ratings are bad, a teacher
may not look at them; and therefore not get valuable feedback about how to improve (i.e., not be able to change her actions
appropriately); and hence become locked into a spiral of poor teaching. Similarly, not taking a medical test may  mean that
a person is not treated early enough to halt the progress of a serious disease, and so on.In these situations, we should expect information avoidance to be especially prevalent among people who  discount the
future in an extreme, or hyperbolic, fashion, putting disproportionate weight on the present. Present-bias would lead to a
disproportionate weighting of the short-term costs of looking as compared with the long-term beneﬁts of gaining the feared
information.
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.6. Consumer choice
In a recent experiment, Ellen Evers and colleagues (Evers et al., 2014a; see, earlier, Evers et al., 2014b) presented college
tudents with a choice between a set of cheap plastic pens, each a different color, and a notebook. Other students were
resented with the same choice, but, added to the cheap plastic pens were two  more pens of the same color as one of the
ens in the prior set. A majority of students chose the smaller set of all-different-colored pens over the notebook; however,
espite the fact that the pen collection was objectively enhanced by the addition of the two  same-colored pens, a majority of
tudents chose the notebook over the larger collection. This pattern violates monotonicity, which is one of the simplest and
idely accepted principles of good decision making. It can be understood as a manifestation of the preference for simplicity:
all different” is much simpler to encode than the mish-mash of same and different colors that was created by the addition
f the two same-color pens.
Evers and colleagues showed, too, that how items were organized made a big difference to choice behavior. For example,
hen the two pens in the above example were separated from the other pens, creating one all-different set and another
ll-same set, then preferences shifted back in favor of the pens over the notebook. Similarly, when people chose sets of
ottles of beer, they preferred those with a simple organization, either being all different or all the same; a set of beers which
ostly differed but had some repetitions was less preferred.
As a body, these experiments show the people have a strong preference for sets of items that can be organized simply—in
ur terms, they are easy to make sense of. Indeed, the authors further attribute these preferences to the preference for sets
hat are easily described—i.e., that have a short code-length. A ﬁnal study in the paper sought to provide strong evidence that
he preference for all-different and all-same was, in fact, derivative of the preference for descriptive simplicity. In this study
tudents made choices between two box-sets of BB King compact disks, which were deliberately chosen to be comparable
n desirability. One of the two box sets, however, was randomly selected for each subject to be described as all having
een recorded in Biloxi, or Tupelo, two locations which a pretest had identiﬁed as not particularly desirable locations for a
ecording to have been made. Despite the undesirability of these recording locations, providing a description that, in effect,
made sense’ of one collection or the other tended to increase preference for that collection.
.7. Esthetics
The question of why some pieces of art, movies, plays, literature etc. are widely appreciated, whereas others are not,
as received surprisingly little attention from social and behavioral scientists, perhaps because it is seen as a problem too
ifﬁcult to yield workable insights. Indeed, as represented most vividly by the famous paper by Stigler and Becker (1977)
De gustibus non est disputandum” (there is no arguing with tastes), many economists have been adamant that the origin
f tastes is a topic that lies outside of the purview of their profession. Although certainly not addressing all relevant causal
actors (e.g., there is certainly a huge amount of social ‘herding’ incumbent in art appreciation), our framework does provide
ome hints about determinants of esthetic tastes.
Quite analogous to our discussion of two ways that the drive for sense-making plays into curiosity (i.e., the desire to make
ense of stimuli provided, such as riddles, and the desire for information that promises to make sense of existing, stored,
nformation), one can imagine two ways that sense-making plays into esthetics.
The ﬁrst is that we are likely to have a preference for materials that can be made sense of—books and movies with
oherent plots; representational art and so on. The desire for sense-making within the stimuli provided is probably most
haracteristic of what is sometimes referred to as “lowbrow” art—art that is enjoyable to experience but doesn’t leave us
ith much in the long-term.
The second is the preference for literature, art and so forth that may  not provide much sense-making in and of itself, but
elps us to make sense of other aspects of our lives or our world. The painting Guernica, for example, is somewhat painful to
ook at, but gives the viewer a new perspective on war. As Schmidhuber (2009, p. 11) notes in a paper that is closely related
o this one, “good observer-dependent art deepens the observer’s insights about this world or possible worlds, unveiling
reviously unknown regularities, connecting previously disconnected patterns in an initially surprising way.”
Even though the second category can help to explain why much art is anything but simple to make sense of, it probably
oesn’t go sufﬁciently far in explaining the preference for such work. Indeed, there almost seems to be some pleasure, or at
east excitement, to be derived from art that doesn’t make sense of the world, or that even deﬁes sense-making. In a letter to
is brothers, the poet John Keats used the term “negative capability” to refer, in laudatory terms, to a situation in which “a
an  is capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason.” (Bate, 2009,
. 249) He coined the term (and its deﬁnition) as a contrast to the proclivities of the poet Coleridge, who, Keats complained
o his brothers, was “incapable of remaining content with half-knowledge.” Coleridge, according to Keats, was searching
or a single, higher-order truth or solution to the mysteries of the natural world, a task which Keats, who saw the world as
nﬁnite and impenetrable, viewed as crass.
The pleasures of esthetics need not be limited to the traditional arts. Sunstein (2015), for example, in an insightful book
eview titled “How Star Wars Illuminates Constitutional Law,” writes about the pleasures of learning, in the climactic scene
f The Empire Strikes Back, that Darth Vader is Luke Skywalker’s father. As Chris Taylor (2014) expresses it in the book
hat Sunstein reviews, this suddenly explains “at a strike why everyone from Uncle Owen to Obi-Wan to Yoda has been so
oncerned about Luke’s development, and whether he would grow up to be like his father.” Sunstein argues that similar
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moments happen in constitutional legal scholarship: “In constitutional law, many law professors argue for such moments,
for example by recognizing new limits on the power of the federal government or new rights of various sorts.”
4.8. Science
Science is sometimes viewed as the antithesis of art, yet our framework points to some key commonalities. Scientists are
certainly motivated, in part, by a desire the search for fame and fortune, but many if not most are probably also driven by a
motive more closely related to the current perspective—the desire for sense-making. As Glynn (2010) points out in his book
“Elegance in Science,” scientists as well as lay-people can be thrilled by their assimilation of a new theoretical perspective
that sheds light on disparate, otherwise confusing, facts. Wilkinson (2015), likewise, in an article on mathematician Yitang
Zhang’s solution of the “bound gaps” problem in math, writes that:
Pure mathematics, as opposed to applied mathematics, is done with no practical purposes in mind. It is as close to
art and philosophy as it is to engineering. “My result is useless for industry,” Zhang said. The British mathematician
G. H. Hardy wrote in 1940 that mathematics is, of “all the arts and sciences, the most austere and the most remote.”
Bertrand Russell called it a refuge from “the dreary exile of the actual world.” Hardy believed emphatically in the
precise aesthetics of math. A mathematical proof, such as Zhang produced, “should resemble a simple and clear-cut
constellation,” he wrote, “not a scattered cluster in the Milky Way.” Edward Frenkel, a math professor at the University
of California, Berkeley, says Zhang’s proof has “a renaissance beauty,” meaning that though it is deeply complex, its
outlines are easily apprehended. The pursuit of beauty in pure mathematics is a tenet. Last year, neuroscientists in
Great Britain discovered that the same part of the brain that is activated by art and music was activated in the brains
of mathematicians when they looked at math they regarded as beautiful.
We reproduce the passage in full because it touches on so many of the themes discussed in this paper. First, the fact that
the “result is useless for industry” highlights the fact that insight is valued in its own right, apart from any material gains it
confers. Second, Hardy’s view that a mathematical proof should resemble a simple and clear-cut constellation” as opposed
to a “scattered cluster” makes clear that mathematical proofs are very much a matter of sense-making, as does Wilkinson’s
description of Zhang’s proof as “deeply complex” but with “outlines [that] are easily apprehended.” Frenkel’s comment that
Zhang’s proof has “a renaissance beauty” draws connections between scientiﬁc insight and esthetic appreciation, as does
the reference to neuroscience research.
The pleasure derived from sense-making is not only a source of scientiﬁc progress, but also of stagnation, because once a
scientist has arrived at a particular form of sense-making, and especially if they are attached to it in virtue of having proposed
it or adopted it over a span of time, they are likely to become resistant to abandoning it—for reasons closely related to those
discussed in the subsection above on conﬁrmation bias.
4.9. Concern about others’ beliefs
One of the most consequential, yet rarely studied, features of human motivation is the extent to which people care about
others’ beliefs. People sort geographically on the basis of beliefs, avoid interacting with people holding different beliefs and,
when they can’t avoid interacting with people holding different beliefs, avoid the ‘conversational mine-ﬁelds’ associated with
actually discussing their differences. People expose themselves to media consistent with their existing beliefs, proselytize
to try to bring others’ beliefs into conformity with their own  and, at the extreme, seek to silence those they disagree with,
in some cases by trying to kill them.
Why  do people care about others’ beliefs; why don’t we take a live-and-let-live attitude toward what is, after all, invisible
in other people’s minds? Our theory of sense-making provides one possible explanation. Beliefs, according to the theoretical
perspective propounded here, are part and parcel of sense-making; people choose beliefs that ﬁt with the larger sense that
they make of the world. A negative change in the degree to which one’s life makes sense is aversive, and this is especially
true as a result of the inclusion of the change term, and is further exacerbated by loss aversion. Confronting beliefs that are
incompatible with one’s own, perhaps via an interpersonal encounter or exposure to media, according to this perspective,
is aversive because it is impossible to escape the recognition that (at least) one set of beliefs must be wrong, and it may not
be possible to conﬁdently rule out the possibility that it is one’s own beliefs, and the sense-making they are part of, that are
deﬁcient. (See Golman et al., 2016, for a related, and more fully developed perspective on this issue.)
4.10. Conspiracy theories and religion
A “conspiracy theory” (a term coined by Karl Popper) is, according to Wikipedia, “an explanatory proposition that accuses
two or more persons, a group, or an organization of having caused or covered up, through secret planning and deliberate
action, an illegal or harmful event or situation.” Although conspiracies undeniably do occur, the term has taken on a pejorative
connotation (Moore, 2002) due to the widespread perception that conspiracies are suspected to occur far more often than
they actually do, as well as to the unlikely nature (e.g., implausible degree of coordination between disparate characters) of
many conjectured conspiracies. Social scientists have found that conspiracy theories are widespread, and that conspiracy
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heories are especially embraced by the poor, minorities, and those who  exhibit low levels of trust and high levels of economic
nsecurity (Goertzel, 1994).
A wide range of explanations for the pervasiveness of conspiracy theories have been proposed, but a very large number
f these involve discomfort with uncertainty and lack of understanding of events. Popper himself argued that conspiracy
heories deny the reality that most important events have multiple causes and are the product of a multitude of agents;
onspiracy theories reﬂect the implicit assumption that signiﬁcant events must have been intended and caused by some
ndividual or group. Sunstein and Vermeule (2009), in one of the most comprehensive treatments of the subject, argue
hat the appeal of many conspiracy theories “lies in the attribution of otherwise inexplicable events to intentional action,
nd to an unwillingness to accept the possibility that signiﬁcant adverse consequences may  be a product of invisible hand
echanisms (such as market forces or evolutionary pressures) or of simple chance, rather than of anyone’s plans” (p. 6). The
uthors then continue that “people do not like to believe that signiﬁcant events were caused by bad (or good) luck, and much
refer simpler causal stories. In particular, human “minds protest against chaos,” and people seek to extract a meaning from
 bewildering event or situation, a meaning that a conspiracy may  well supply.”
Interestingly, the explanations that have been proposed for the attraction of conspiracy theories may  also help to explain
he pervasiveness of belief in God. Park (2005) argues, and supports with correlation research, the idea that traumatic
vents strengthen belief in God because of the threat they pose to non-randomness. In a study of 169 students who  had
xperienced the death of a signiﬁcant other in the past year, Park found that, in the short-run, those who were religious
uffered a greater drop in well-being following the death, presumably because their misfortune challenged their belief in
 benign power. However, in the long-term—i.e., for those who had experienced the death further in the past—the effect
eversed, and religiosity was associated with better coping and higher subjective well-being. Kay et al. (2010) also argue
hat attempts to cope with perceptions of randomness may  be a key factor in religious beliefs. “Afﬁrming the existence
f a controlling God,” the authors write, “may provide an excellent means for insulating oneself from the aversive arousal
ssociated with randomness.” (p. 216) Providing some, albeit weak, experimental evidence for this proposition, the authors
ound that subjects who completed a word unscrambling exercise which exposed them to words related to randomness (e.g.,
chance,” “random”) as opposed to negative words (e.g., “slimy”) but who were not subject to a misattribution manipulation,
eported greater belief in supernatural control.
As should already be evident, both conspiracy theories and religion can potentially be viewed as manifestations of the drive
or sense-making. However, they represent quite different approaches. Although Sunstein and Vermeule posit a preference
or “simpler causal stories,” many if not most conspiracy theories are actually fantastically complex. For example, the popular
onspiracy theory that the U.S. government was behind the 9–11 tragedy envisions the government hiring the hijackers,
ooby-trapping the buildings (according to the dominant theory, the airplanes alone would not have been sufﬁcient to cause
heir collapse), and so on. In the language of information theory, this is a very complicated theory (C(e′|B) is high) that makes
erfect sense of the world (C(K|e′, B) is low). Religious beliefs are, in some sense, the opposite; they are a very simple theory:
god causes everything” (C(e′|B) is low) that makes sense of, in the sense of predicts, almost nothing, leaving C(K|e′, B) largely
nchanged.
.11. The importance of narrative
Another manifestation of the drive for sense-making is, likely, the human afﬁnity for narrative—for telling stories about
hings that help to make sense of them. Pennington and Hastie (e.g., 1991, 1992) ﬁnd that jurors are much more persuaded
y narratives which make sense of the facts than by logical arguments. Pennebaker ﬁnds in numerous studies (see, e.g.,
ennebaker and Seagal, 1999) that writing about an emotional personal experience for as little as 15 min  a day confers
ental and physical beneﬁts in as little as three days. “The act of constructing stories. . .”  Pennebaker and Seagal write,
allows one to organize and remember events in a coherent fashion. [and] gives individuals a sense of predictability and
ontrol over their lives.” (p. 1243) Alice Gregory (2015), in an article about a text-message based counseling service, writes
hat “people who spent their high-school years chatting with friends on landlines are often dismissive of texting, as if it
ight be a phase one outgrows, but the form is unparalleled in its ability to relay information concisely. The act of writing,
ven if the product consists of only a hundred and forty characters composed with one’s thumbs, forces a kind of real-time
istillation of emotional chaos.”
Jerome Bruner (in his early career a pioneer of research on sense-making) focused, in late career, on narrative. Bruner,
ike Pennebaker, views the construction of stories as a natural human process that helps people to make sense of their lives
nd ultimately shapes how they live. As Bruner writes, “The self-telling of life narratives achieves the power to structure
erceptual experience, to organize memory, to segment and purpose-build the very ‘events’ of a life. In the end, we become
he autobiographical narratives by which we ‘tell about’ our lives” (2004, p. 694). Bruner’s point is that people don’t only
ry to make sense of their life by forming a narrative of it, but organize their life not only to conform to the narrative they
reate, but with an eye toward burnishing it and maintaining cohesion.
Less momentously, the drive for sense-making might play a role in the human propensity to ‘organize’ (Glushko, 2013).
 typical ofﬁce or living room has, for example, books relatively neatly arranged on shelves, rather than in piles on the ﬂoor.
nd, although many academic ofﬁces violate these norms, visitors’ negative reactions could be interpreted as providing
urther support for the power of the desire for organization. Of course, some aspects of organizing clearly serve pragmatic
unctions (e.g., so that things can be found easily, or use as little storage space as possible). But many aspects of organizing
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(e.g., aligning pictures) have no obvious function; and the existence of extreme organizing behaviors—compulsions—which
can signiﬁcantly impede, rather than contributing to, the achievement of a person’s wider goals, strongly suggest that the
desire to organize also has a deeper basis. A curious observation, for which we  have no explanation (but suspect that the
explanation is interesting) is that procrastination—avoiding doing unpleasant tasks that one should be devoting oneself
to—so often results in organizing as a substitute activity.
4.12. The image and ‘the good life’
Early in the second half of the twentieth century, two very different books were published with the same title, The Image,
published in 1956 by Kenneth Boulding, an economist, discussed how images, and the desire to conform to them, guide
human social behavior. Boulding discusses many of the basic ideas central to this paper. For example, he discusses how
popular concepts shape our vision of reality. He notes that “Veblen, for instance, was  not, I think, a great social scientist, and
yet he invented an undying phrase: “Conspicuous consumption.” After reading Veblen, one can never quite see a university
campus or an elaborate house in just the same light as before” (Boulding, 1956, p. 9). Boulding also talks about how beliefs
can change dramatically as a result of a kind of ‘regime shift,’ which he refers to a “change of the image which might be
described as a revolutionary change.” Boulding attributes the suddenness of the change to “the fact that our image is in itself
resistant to change. When it receives messages which conﬂict with it, its ﬁrst impulse is to reject them as in some sense
untrue.” Daniel Boorstin, a historian, published his The Image 6 years later (in 1962), a book which presented more of a social
critique of how symbol (image) had replaced substance in American culture. Boorstin describes currents in American culture
whereby the reporting of an event becomes more “real” than the event itself. Boorstin coined the term “pseudo-event” to
describe events or activities that serve little purpose other than to be reported via advertisements or media. Boorstin would
undoubtedly have felt vindicated if he were alive today to witness the culture of twitter and ‘selﬁes’.
Whatever one’s value judgments, imagery has almost certainly played a key role in human life from early in the emergence
of the species. Most people walk around with an image of their current situation if not an image of the world they inhabit. And,
if we are to judge from the ubiquity of song lyrics touting different conceptions of the good life (songlyrics.com produces
224 songs with good life in the title) most people also probably have an image of how they would like their lives to be.
Such images of the good life probably play an important role in decision making, simplifying otherwise impossibly difﬁcult
decisions. When it comes to momentous decisions such as whether and who  to marry, where to live, what to study, it is
extremely difﬁcult to calculate costs and beneﬁts. It is much easier, however, to make a judgment about whether a particular
partner, career or location takes one closer, or propels one farther, from one’s image of the good life.
5. Conclusion
In a characteristically insightful paper titled “The Mind as a Consuming Organ,” Thomas Schelling (1987) drew attention
to how much human, and economic, activity is devoted to consumption, not of conventional ‘goods and services,’ but of
events happening purely in the mind. As Schelling wrote, “we  consume with our mouths and noses and ears and eyes
and proprioceptors and skin and ﬁngertips and with the nerves that react to external stimuli and internal hormones; we
consume relief from pain and fatigue, itching and thirst. But we  also consume by thinking. We  consume past events that
we can bring up from memory, future events that we  can believe will happen, contemporary circumstances not physically
present like the respect of our colleagues and the affection of our neighbors and the health of our children” (p. 354). The
consumption-from-thinking that Schelling wrote about was all about pleasures and pains of memory and imagination, and
about self-esteem—the value side of our model. Our central point in this paper is that such belief-based utility still leaves
out an extraordinarily important form of mind-consumption: People also care tremendously about, and devote substantial
time, money and attentional resources, to gaining insight, acquiring knowledge, and making sense of the world.
Most globally, people care not only about how good their lives are, but also about meaning. An earlier paper, on “The
Economics of Meaning” (Karlsson et al., 2004) proposed four possible interpretations of what meaning entails: (1) meaning
as a resolution of preferences; (2), meaning as an extension of oneself either socially or temporally; (3) meaning as an act
of making sense of one’s life; and (4) meaning as an assertion of free will. Our focus in this paper is on the third of these
conceptions of meaning. We  argue that much information collection and processing occurs, not in an effort to make or
perceive our lives in a more positive fashion, but to make sense of our world and of our lives.
In Section III of this paper we proposed a simple model of the drive for sense-making. The model draws a distinction
between autonomous information processing that occurs without conscious volition and external processes that are at
least partly driven by volitional actions. The model assumes that the two  processes are characterized by different objective
functions. Internal processing aims only at maximal simpliﬁcation of a given body of information. We  assume further that the
output of the process is a single construal (interpretation) of the information at any point in time. External processes differ
from internal processes on a number of dimensions. First, the external processes don’t engage directly in sense-making;
their function instead is to select the information provided to the internal process. Second, external processes reﬂect two
underlying motivations: (1) the desire for sense-making (simpliﬁcation) but also (2) the desire to construe the world in
favorable ways.
Subsequent sections of the paper then showed how this simple model can make sense of a wide range of phenomena,
speciﬁcally: curiosity, boredom, ﬂow, conﬁrmation bias, information avoidance, common patterns of consumer preference,
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sthetic preferences, patterns of progress and stagnation in science, belief in God and conspiracy theories, and the role of
arrative and imagery in daily life.
Although we believe that the model proposed in the paper sheds considerable light on each of these applications, all
odels are simpliﬁcations, and we suspect that the current one leaves out some potentially important phenomena. One
uch phenomenon was discussed in the section on esthetics, in connection with Keats’ notion of negative capability: Clearly,
here are situations in which people value stimuli that don’t make sense—that are impossible to simplify—precisely for
hat characteristic. Another, not discussed in the paper, is the pleasure one can sometimes get from a change in the sense
ne makes of the world, even when the new sense is no simpler than the old sense. As long as one isn’t too invested
n one interpretation of one’s knowledge, a sudden transformation to a radically different interpretation can actually be
xceptionally pleasurable, producing, as Sunstein (2015, p. 5) describes it, “an ‘aha’, a shiver, a tingle of the spine.”
The motives discussed in this paper are by no means new, but have been central to human existence from our beginnings.
ndeed, they may  be present in other species such as cats, which are anecdotally notable for their curiosity. However,
nformational motivations are especially prominent in humans, and appear to be assuming an ever more important role in
uman affairs. As numerous commentators have pointed out (e.g., Gleick, 2011), we are well into what could be called the
information age’—a time in which information has become much more central to our lives and economies than the more
angible products that played a more central role in earlier periods.
Simpliﬁcation has, of course, an upside and downside. On the one hand, simpliﬁcation brings tremendous efﬁciencies in
ecision making and problem solving. On the other hand, simpliﬁcation is associated with destructive stereotyping, dogged
ttachment to outmoded theories, the pursuit of images of the good life that probably wouldn’t bring us much pleasure
ere we ever to attain them, and to the substitution of symbol for substance in American, and probably world, culture.
hatever its ups and downs, identifying the existence of the drive for simpliﬁcation, and its role in daily judgment and
ecision making, will hopefully help social scientists to make sense of the complexities of human existence.
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